How has patriotism changed after the unification of September 11th

336 Right - Left - Center. The Patriotism Discourse in the Berlin Republic Volker Kronenberg 1. Introduction: “Lechts und rinks” Tone and tenor have changed. There is no doubt that something has changed since Germany discussed constitutional and / or national patriotism for the first time twenty-five years ago in the so-called “historians' dispute” 1 and thirteen years later on the concept of “leading culture”. In both cases it was a fruitless debate, oriented less towards understanding and more towards defiant assertions. But tone and tenor have since become more thoughtful. Today, the tone in the debate about both terms and the related content is quieter, the tenor more deliberate, more differentiated. The historical and party-political struggle of 1986/87 and 2000 has been replaced by a factual, problem-conscious and detailed debate about patriotism, the constitution and the dominant culture, as well as about “integration” - despite the recent excitement about Thilo Sarrazin's pamphlet “Germany abolishes himself ”.2 A debate that seeks to re-examine the normative foundations of the free democratic basic order of the Federal Republic in the face of virulent socio-cultural challenges and changed political constellations in Germany and Europe.3 As a result, the concept of patriotism today, more than twenty years after the reunification of Germany, by no means more frankly than "conservative", but rather as an important political virtue associated with a liberal republicanism and the Federal Republic is proclaimed as a "fatherland" 4 from the left.5 And even in the debate about the "leading cultu r ”, which was initially understood as“ black and brown confectionery for German national voters ”6, in short: as a deeply conservative topos, is a movement in the apparently clear right-left fronts. 1 Cf. Historikerstreit 1987. 2 Cf. Sarrazin 2010 3 Cf. on this Wulff 2010. 4 Cf. Fuhr 2005. 5 Cf. in detail Kronenberg 2010. 6 Jörges 2006, p. 73. 337. In both cases, “patriotism” and “Leitkultur”, there is a clear assignment certain political or ideological positions are becoming increasingly difficult. According to the thesis of the article, this can only be useful for the debate about the content associated with the terms - even if, as the following analysis should also show, the right-left arithmetic in some respects already twenty-five or twelve years ago questionable and paradoxical. Yes, with a view to the political and cultural change processes and paradoxes of the past quarter century and the sometimes anachronistic attempts to assign terms and content to apparently unambiguous political camps or ideological currents, one feels reminded of Ernst Jandl's sentence: “Some mean // lechts and rinks // you can't change // what an illtum! ”7 2. Paradox I: The advance from the“ right ”In the eighties, the advance supposedly came from the“ right ”. The "Historikerstreit", which can hardly be described as a serious historiographical debate, but rather as a columnist culture war in the late phase of the Bonn Republic8, flared up twenty-five years ago about the alleged historical-political machinations of a phalanx of historians with a national history - that was the charge from the left-liberal side - under the sign of Kohl's “spiritual-moral turn”, historicizing National Socialism and its unique crimes in a pan-European context, i.e. wanting to dispose of them in a relative manner. But in the course of the dispute it quickly became clear that the four suspected “right-wing” historians Michael Stürmer, Klaus Hildebrand, Andreas Hillgruber and Ernst Nolte, Jürgen Habermas in a much noticed and momentous newspaper article entitled “A kind of damage settlement. The apologetic tendencies in German historiography ”9 compiled in July 1986, did not unite any conspiratorial action with a national-conservative thrust and the incriminated historians would probably never understand or describe themselves as“ rights ”. Michael Stürmer was included in the so-called "Gang of Four" (Elie Wiesel) solely because he dared to use the term "patriotism" in 1986, on the eve of the peaceful revolution in the GDR 7 Jandl 1997. 8 Cf. Geiss 1992. 9 Habermas 1986. 338 as well as that of the “Nation” 10 in the German context in a positive way and to explain Hitler's triumph in 1933, among other things, with a defeat of the “bourgeois virtues” in Germany.11 “Patriotism”, “ Nation ”,“ raison d'être ”- parameters by means of which striker repeatedly analyzed and tried to answer“ German questions ”in the past and present. Focusing on the anchoring of Germany as a republic in the “Western tradition” and “the moral quality of its political way of life” 12, Stürmer always reminded - basically applied - that the “validity of the community among the people [..] of forms and the living symbols, the reference to the splendor and misery of the past and the certainty of tomorrow [need, VK] that comes from the memory of yesterday ”13. Today, a quarter of a century later, the excitement over Michael Stürmer in the “Historikerstreit” undoubtedly seems strange. But at the end of the eighties, because of his views, Striker was placed in the “right”, in the conservative corner. On the eve of the unexpected national unity of Germany, the nation-state “German” perspective had withdrawn in favor of a post-national, European perspective. Paradoxical, but true: it was precisely this post-national perspective that turned out to be “a decidedly self-referential provincial-national figure of thought” at the moment when it was put to the realpolitical test with the peaceful revolution in the GDR in 1989. And yet, in the years that followed German unity, reservations about the nation and national patriotism remained noticeable, as Andreas Rödder notes in his story of reunification: “'Germany united fatherland' [...], three words from the text of the hymn of the socialist German state with an all-German claim [...] marked a much more difficult task in the unexpectedly unified Germany than had been expected in 1989/90. ”15 Maxim Biller's verdict, which was still apodictic a decade after reunification, may be symptomatic of this difficulty claimed who had over 10 strikers in 1986a. 11 strikers 1986b. 12 Stürmer 1986a, p. 329. 13 Stürmer 1988, p. 28. 14 Cammann 2005, p. 62. 15 Rödder 2009, p. 12. 339 Germany argues that anyone who wants to determine it intellectually and thus also celebrate and constitute will become everyone Sometimes end up as arsonist and murderer.16 Today, ten years later, Biller's distrust of patriotism in and for Germany seems downright anachronistic. In the meantime, the fundamentals have changed almost as if in fast motion. Stubborn reservations of a conceptual and substantive nature have largely been overcome and patriotism seems to be becoming part of the German raison d'être. The plea for a new patriotism in Germany, which Charlotte Knobloch formulated by referring to the following: “Only those who affirm their country and identify with their nation and its history will interfere, for example, as a sign of such a change. And don't leave the shaping of the present to the eternal. That is why it is important to develop a new patriotism. [...] We need [..] common symbols, such as the flag or the anthem, which unites us all - regardless of our origin or religion. And I think a pluralistic and democratic society can provide a home for everyone. Because a pluralistic society is characterized by mutual respect and offers space to live unity in diversity. ”17 With this changed perspective, which is exemplary in Knobloch's work, twenty years after the peaceful revolution and reunification, the nation-centered over the constitution-centered perspective prevailed and replaced the latter ? Are constitution and patriotism no longer understood as related to one another in the political culture of the Berlin Republic? Not at all, even if or precisely because, after 1990, constitutional patriotism is increasingly traced back to its more comprehensive original concept, as Dolf Sternberger formulated it in 1979. On the occasion of the thirty-year entry into force of the Basic Law, Sternberger had declared the “Constitution”, understood as a “mixed constitution”, to be the benchmark for specifically Federal Republican patriotism in a highly regarded article in the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” and left no doubt that it was by no means a stopgap measure, not a substitute for national patriotism.18 Sternberger rather pointed out that patriotism in a main European tradition had always and essentially had something to do with the state constitution, indeed that patriotism was originally and essentially 16 Cf. Biller 2001, pp. 83f. 17 Knobloch 2009. 18 Cf. Sternberger 1979. 340 “constitutional patriotism”. The current state of the nation state was not subject to reservation at Sternberger as long as it was based on the principles of humanity, freedom and equality of its citizens. In view of Germany's special constitution, Dolf Sternberger's constitution-centered patriotism was not conceived as a substitute for national patriotism, but rather as a complementary form of identification of the citizens with a concrete, liberal and historically responsible republic: be it the "Bonn" or the "Berlin republic" .19 It is precisely this Sternberger interpretation of “constitutional patriotism” that Jürgen Habermas now approaches when he emphasizes that contrary to a “widespread misunderstanding”, “constitutional patriotism” means “that citizens do not only understand the principles of the constitution in their abstract content, but concretely from the historical context of their own national history ”and it is also“ in the constitutional state's own interest ”to“ deal carefully with all cultural sources from which the norm consciousness and solidarity of citizens arise is ”.20 In short: Instead of abstract,“ universalistic constitutional principles ”beyond national peculiarities, which should still be in the“ historians' dispute ”, there is now a patriotism that is well founded on a national level and at the same time, without this being a contradiction , reflected both in the cosmopolitan and concrete constitutional norms of our Basic Law as well as rooted in the European or Western cultural tradition. There are various interrelated reasons why the old dispute patterns along the contrast between “constitution” and “nation” are now giving way in favor of a largely consensual understanding of patriotism. On the one hand, the return to the “nation” on this side of a post-national European idea that took place during the red-green reign and, related to this, the proclamation of a liberal patriotism within a democratic nation. On the other hand, the enormous integration-political and demographic-immigration-political challenges of German society, as they came to light in the "Leitkulturdebatte" 21. Furthermore, and most importantly, the need for a readjustment of the state-citizen relationship as well as the need to stimulate the civic willingness to help and its abilities in the service of a solidarity and civil society. Last but not least, and psychologically significant: the black-red-gold enthusiasm of the Germans in the course of the soccer world champions 19 See in detail Kronenberg 2006a, pp. 189-215. 20 Cf. Habermas 2009. 21 Cf. Lammert 2006. 341schaft 2006.22 There are differently positioned and yet interwoven factors that have led to the republican virtue23 of patriotism in the Sternberger sense not only being conceded, but positively accentuated and - keyword "Leitkultur" - a common cultural foundation is recognized as a necessity in Germany - beyond the "ideological war" that breaks out now and then of the old Bonn republic and beyond the well-known political "camp boundaries". 3. Paradox II: The advance from the “left” Who would have suspected immediately before the start of the red-green reign in 1998 that a little later a “patriotism from the left” 24 would seek rapprochement with the German nation, even the Berlin Republic is declared a “fatherland” 25? 26 The catharsis of government experience since 1998 has led to such surprising and significant historical-political readjustments in the left-wing democratic camp that Eckhard Fuhr today retrospectively describes the “end of the post-war period” as the “leitmotif” 27 of the Schröder era. In fact, this leitmotif was struck again and again in the period from 1998 to 2005, be it that German soldiers were sent to the first war mission since 1945, Gerhard Schröder, a German Chancellor, took part in the Allied anniversary celebrations for the victory over Hitler's Germany for the first time, or the Federal Chancellor debated with Martin Walser in front of a concentrated media audience about the “sense of history”. Be it the “German way” in the Iraq conflict - natural and normal, as Egon Bahr said28 - be it the reminiscence of the “patriotic resistance” against Hitler29, be it the adaptation of the interest concept: Gerhard Schröder accentuated the traditional historical-political coordinates of the reunified Germany in contrast to its predecessor Helmut Kohl - unexpectedly self-confident and of course also following the compulsory action That a united Europe and a united Germany, that integration and nation in no way contradict each other, but rather require this insight 22 Cf. Kronenberg / Becker 2010. 23 Cf. Viroli 2002. 24 Cf. Glotz et al. 2005. 25 Cf. Kronenberg 2009a. 26 See Kronenberg 2009b. 27 Cf. Fuhr 2007, p. 4. 28 Cf. Bahr 2003. 29 Cf. Grafe 2005, p. 26f. For Red-Green, 342 grew to the extent that the political project of a “European Federation”, as Foreign Minister Fischers had outlined in his much-noticed Humboldt speech in 2000, increasingly shattered due to the realpolitical sensitivities of a heterogeneous European Union. Like the physiognomy of “European Germany”, which Thomas Mann once postulated visionary and which today belongs to the core of German raison d'etat as a self-image, at the beginning of the 21st century in view of significantly changed global political (“September 11, 2001”), European (“EU 27 “) And the internal and socio-political framework conditions should look concretely, the consensus on this must (have) be found anew. As incomplete as this process of discovery is to this day, two kinds of knowledge have now also become unequivocally established in the red-green camp: First, that patriotism and Europeanism are not opposites - rather, two sides of the same coin - and second, that modern, integrated and at the same time The sovereign nation-state is still the most abstract form of political communitarisation, which effects individual legal protection, guarantees democratic control procedures and is able to create a democratic public sphere - and thus, as a consequence and entirely functional, also requires republican, ergo: patriotic care. This is what the patriotism discourse of the last few years is about: to sensitize citizens to the necessity, for their own patria, for the country in which they were either born or for which they have willingly decided and to which they belong feels to stand up actively, in everyday and small matters as well as in exceptional situations when it comes to the “big picture”: the defense and future security of the nation as a state-based community of consciousness of all citizens. Patriotism means more than a noncommittal enthusiasm for national symbols, however important such symbols are on another level for a feeling of togetherness among a heterogeneous citizenry. On the other hand, patriotism points beyond a pre-political attachment to one's homeland without negating this existential human dimension. Patriotism doesn’t mean talking, but acting: voluntary, solidarity, common good behavior of the citizens. Wasn't patriotism from the left (re) discovered and postulated by chance during the Schröder / Fischer reign? That is to be assumed. To put it bluntly: It was also given such a noticeably positive accent because the state (s) ran out of money and the “Agenda 2010” required a rhetorical superstructure. In addition, John F. Kennedy's patriotic phrase, “Don't ask what your country is.” 30 Cf. Kronenberg 2006b. 343 can do for you, but what you can do for your country "in a sense and as a substitute for a" reform necessity myth "(Markus Linden). Admittedly, this is a shortened explanation for a new patriotism from the left, especially since other political and social factors played a role. The fact is, however, that Gerhard Schröder in the context of his reform agenda 2010, as he put it, called for “responsibility for our country” to be a “demanding reform program” that “should not be limited to legislative resolutions”, but that is what it is all about must go to "change the reality in Germany" 31. With explicit reference to those "so-called secondary virtues", which Oskar Lafontaine had once dismissed with the hint that one could also run a concentration camp with them, Schröder set his sights on the preservation of "social coherence" in Germany and set it as Chancellor A red-green federal government set in motion a process that could hardly have been expected a few years earlier, which in substance had more to do with that “spiritual-moral turn” than what Schröder's predecessor Helmut Kohl postulated rhetorically at the beginning of the 1980s, however Had never seriously pursued.32 The fact that Kohl's “spiritual and moral turnaround” came to nothing was paradoxically essential because the political and social resistance to it was primarily built up and sustained by those political forces who were now on the matter years later were not after anything else themselves. One of the most vehement critics of Kohl's supposedly neo-conservative tendency was Gerhard Schröder, who, as his successor and under the self-confident label of the patriot, set in motion a comprehensive political and social reform process during his seven-year term of office, even in view of the acute pressure to act had to. It may be that Schröder was more of someone driven by practical constraints, who was looking for a rhetorical superstructure to unleash civic potential and, above all, to win over bourgeois milieus for his politics. It may be that actually those “sons and daughters of sixty-eight” who were now responsible for government at Red-Green began to identify more than just functionally with their country, with their republic - the decisive factor is that tone and tenor in the political one and social debate about the self-image of the Federal Republic as the “Berlin Republic” had changed and “bourgeoisie” not today, as illustrated by the multi-faceted debate on black-green perspectives of a “new” bourgeoisie33, a specific party or a firmly established party “camp” “Can be assigned. 31 Schröder 2005. 32 Kronenberg 2010, p. 16ff. 33 Cf. Kronenberg / Weckenbrock 2011. 344 Patriotism and bourgeoisie, patriotism and civil society belong together, are related topoi, which in turn intend a culture of responsible freedom of civil society and its primacy over the bureaucratic or all-responsible welfare and intervention state. It is by no means coincidental that the term “civil society” 34 is based on the inconspicuous reality of common sense, the functioning common sense as it can be observed in the political culture of the West and as historically conveyed by Alexis de Tocqueville on the basis of “democracy in America” 35 . Tocqueville taught us in the 19th century that inspiration and motivation to act patriotically awaken when people - as citizens - see each other or at least reveal a certain social profile. Solidarity and a sense of community require a foundation of specific commonality that goes beyond belonging to the human race itself and that condenses and consolidates in personal and functional relationships such as family and company, in the local, regional area, at the national level.36 This is precisely what teaches us us Max Weber - characterizes nation: “that certain groups of people can be expected to have a specific sense of solidarity towards others” .37 This explains to what extent “nation” and “constitution” belong together today and that patriotism, historically and currently, is not a politically camp-specific, party-politically polarizing project but rather aims to address the question of who is making what contribution to the welfare of the community in an integrative way. In view of the virulent demographic crisis in terms of immigration and integration policy, the question of the subject, the citizen, is linked to the dichotomy of “multiculturalism” and “leading culture”. It looks for the necessary degree of political or even cultural integration into a political community that is always a concrete country shaped by norms in both legal and moral terms. 4. Paradox III: The alternative of “Leitkultur” and “Multiculturalism” One of the most hotly debated questions in Germany in recent years is: In a modern, cosmopolitan and tolerant community like the Federal Republic, it is enough to identify with or pay attention to the articles of the 34 See Dettling 2008. 35 See Tocqueville 1959. 36 See Isensee 1998. 37 Weber 1988, p. 528. 345 or of the Basic Law, or is cultural integration necessary beyond that? An integration that recognizes cultural pluralism as a matter of course, at the same time rejects the demand for cultural assimilation and yet seeks to take into account the dangers of a free, democratic community through the existence of fragmented parallel societies not united by a consensus of values? It was not only the heated discussion about Thilo Sarrazin's theses38 that initiated or promoted reflection on this question. Thinking about the right measure and the constantly re-exploring middle were already at the center of the debate that Bundestag President Norbert Lammert cautiously initiated in 2005 after his election as Bundestag President.39 The tone in which this debate was conducted was far more moderate and the The tenor is more ponderous than in the controversy surrounding this “imprecise, misleading, misleading” 40 term of “leading culture”, which had already taken place once in 2000, briefly and sterile, against a socially polarized background. The fact that five years later one did not exhaust oneself in partisan, ideological and partly also anti-Islamic reflexes (which Sarrazin and other publicists41 tried to provoke again with relish) or contented oneself with detailed semantic work on the term “Leitkultur” undoubtedly caused social problems to do, which was connected with various events in an exemplary manner: be it the debate about “Allah's daughters without rights” 42 in Germany, be it the so-called Berlin “honor killing” of the German-Turkish woman Hatun Sürücü in February 2005 it was the discussions about the Berlin “Rütli” and “Hoover School”. Be it, in an international context, but highly regarded in this country, the religiously motivated murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in November 2004, not least the so-called “cartoon dispute” in 2005/2006. These events forced one to think about the questions "What do we stand for?", "Who are we?" And "What unites us?", Which are to be viewed in their own context and yet all of them are political, cultural and social The self-image of the Federal Republic against the background of an integration policy that has basically failed for decades43.44 38 Cf. Deutschland Stiftung Integration 2010. 39 Cf. Lammert 2006. 40 This is the description in Korn 2006, p. 115. 41 In this context, Patrick Bahners speaks of “Panikmachern”, see Bahners 2011. 42 See Der Spiegel, No. 47/2004. 43 See Luft 2007. 44 See Kronenberg 2008. 346 “Leitkultur” and “Multiculturalism”, paradoxically understood for a long time as strict, theoretical opposites, emerged in the course of the debate beyond the semantic level as pseudo alternatives for solving specific social problems. “A de facto multicultural society like ours,” said Jörg Lau, formulated an emerging factual consensus beyond conceptual reservations, “needs a leading culture. The point is to recognize the new diversity of this country - in cultural, ethnic and religious terms - and to learn to live with it without slipping into a value relativism. "45 These are the" younger intellectuals with a migration background "named by Lau as an example. such as Seyran Ateş, Feridun Zaimoglu or Zafer Zenocak, who today use terms such as “Leitkultur”, nation and patriotism “surprisingly impartially” and “have no understanding of the German misunderstanding” in these questions, and who “even considered this to be extremely harmful” and consider a "liberal patriotism" as well as the "orientation towards a leading culture" in the de facto multicultural German society as possible and desirable.46 Renate Künast also admits in view of "decades of repressed integration problems" in Germany that "the basic set of rules and shared convictions that hold society together ”, that this“ minimal consensus ”“ nic ht only consist of paragraphs ”47. Increasingly, supported by the red-green as well as the liberal-conservative side, there is a consensual agreement that the obligation to common values, rights and obligations to regulate living together is the decisive prerequisite for a society shaped by immigration to its citizens makes it possible to “no longer just coexist”, but to “live peacefully and safely together” 48. Insofar as multiculturalism means cultural pluralism with recognition of a binding set of values, the contradiction between “multi” and “leading” culture is actually an apparent one. However, insofar as multiculturalism seeks to negate the existence of a common foundation of values, rights and duties and instead seeks to establish an equal parallelism of different, even opposing cultures, it is diametrically opposed to a cultural model that recognizes a tolerant pluralism. A model that is reflected in the free democratic basic order of the Federal Republic - knowing full well that the catalog of human and civil rights laid down in the Basic Law is not in itself a humanistic tradition 45 Lau 2006. 46 Quoted from ibid. 47 Künast 2006, p. 129. 48 Ateş 2006, p. 31. 347, which turns people into lawful citizens. Above all, this requires education. Education that concretizes abstract values ​​such as tolerance, respect, participation, solidarity and makes them vivid and practicable. Education that is taught in schools, be it in the form of civics, political or social science courses, or compulsory naturalization courses. Education, which must also essentially include a command of the German language and the basics of German and European history. Education, which should include religious instruction and thus - for children of the Muslim faith - Islam instruction in German schools in German. In addition to education and other state guarantees and obligations, it is also essential to have a change in attitude, a change in awareness within the citizens themselves. A change in awareness that is oriented towards common sense, which, symbolically expressed in the black, red and gold summer of 2006, is gradually emerging and emerging does not give rise to a new “feeling for Germany” 49 for everyone, and for some intellectuals all the more surprising. However, beyond the emotional, it is specifically about answering the question of who as a citizen is willing to voluntarily, patriotically make what contribution to a solidarity-based responsible and civil society, as it is, for example, by Udo Di Fabio50, Meinhard Miegel51 or Paul Nolte52 in the view is taken. For its part, such a society does not want to replace the state and its classical functions, but rather seeks to reduce it to these classical functions. It is not about turning away from the welfare state or the establishment of a "night watchman state", rather a civil responsible society seeks to draw conclusions from the fact that welfare state redistribution is unable to hold society together from within in the long term. Especially in the awareness that a free republic, as Cicero already knew and formulated around 2000 years ago, cannot guarantee the existing conditions of its existence itself. 49 Cf. Mohr 2005. 50 Cf. di Fabio 2005. 51 Cf. Miegel 2005. 52 Cf. Nolte 2004. 348 5. Conclusion: The open flank of the liberal republic In relation to the present, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde dresses this ancient knowledge in the paradox of everyone liberal, secularized state - and thus also that of the Federal Republic of Germany. According to Böckenförde, he lives “on conditions [...] that he cannot guarantee himself. That is the great risk he took for the sake of freedom. On the one hand, it can only exist as a free state if the freedom it grants its citizens is regulated from within, based on the moral substance of the individual and the homogeneity of society. On the other hand, he cannot seek to guarantee these internal regulatory forces on his own initiative, i.e. by means of legal coercion and authoritative command, without giving up his freedom and - on the secularized level - falling back into that claim to totality from which he was led in the denominational civil wars has. ”53 The fact that Germany is a free republic and a democratic nation-state today, 60 years after the founding of the Federal Republic and 20 years after reunification, is seriously out of the question. Rather, what is at issue is a patriotic self-reassurance of what “being German” can and should mean today and in the future, in the awareness of this fundamental paradox of a republican polity. And why, one might ask, does such self-assurance even have to be undertaken? Isn't it just an academic glass bead game? No. A republic, if it wants to exist in the long term, needs a virtue discourse54 on various levels and in various factual contexts, which "not only takes institutional questions into account, but also the socio-moral requirements that remain precarious because they cannot be institutionalized" 55 of the existing state order takes. If one turns to patriotism, one cannot only speak of (reform, savings, engagement) necessities, constraints and challenges.Herfried Münkler is right in saying that “just being a Republican of reason is not enough. Something is missing: heart and feeling. ”56 The emotional bond with the patria is an additional factor. A bond that is essential for people, but cannot be absolute. 53 Böckenförde 1992, p. 112. See also the 2007. 54 See Viroli 2002. 55 Münkler 2009a. 56 Münkler 2009b. 349 No secular particularism, so the consequence of Jean Améry as a displaced person in the horrors of the totalitarian age, can presume to want to grasp the human being in his entirety.57 It would violate the human condition - which at the same time, dialectically mirrored, but also on the earthly home as the "biotope of reliability" 58 is dependent on. “My” home, “my” region, “my country”: love, passion and joy, affirmation and belief in the future are just as much a part of patriotism as suffering from grievances and failures in the present and the past. “Patriotism”, as Paul Nolte remarks very appropriately, accentuating the rational downside of the emotional, “does not cheer one's own country, its own conditions, but is ignited by the mistakes of the past as well as the grievances of the present. He does not deny emotions - some would speak of love for their own country - but is not satisfied with feelings but only takes place in practical action. ”59 6. Eight theses on a patriotism of measure and middle A well-understood, contemporary and Cosmopolitan "Patriotism 2.0" 60, as I call it, as a fundamental political virtue of the Berlin Republic can be characterized by eight theses: 1.) Patriotism means voluntary action for the common good Patriotism has an emotional dimension, but also aims at reason and is concretized in (civic) civil action. Patriotism means standing up for one another without closing oneself off from the outside world. Patriotism means passion and suffering at the same time, it can mean emphatic sympathy as well as coolly calculated action and leads to added value for the res populi. 2.) Patriotism as a bourgeois project is neither right nor left Patriotism is not “right” and, even if it has arisen there recently, does not belong to the left either. Patriotism is not suitable for party-tactical games or even for party-political stigmatization, but should be used as a funda- 57 Améry 1997. 58 Funke 2006. 59 Nolte 2005, p. 78. 60 Cf. the theses in Kronenberg 2010, pp. 131-134. 350 mental political virtue should be borne by a broad consensus of (civil) social and state actors. Patriotism is a bourgeois, more precisely: a civic project and cannot be appropriated as a topic by any political party. 3.) Patriotism cannot be enforced, but it can be promoted. It is the paradox of every free, democratic state that it rests on foundations, on attitudes and behavior of its citizens that it cannot guarantee itself. Patriotism as free republicanism, which as such can make an important contribution to the self-preservation of the community, can only come from the citizens themselves, but can be promoted by the state. Education, culture and religion, family, integration and volunteering policies are essential areas in which the state can take concrete action beyond pathetic rhetoric and well-intentioned appeals. 4.) Patriotism enables social integration and benefits from this. For an immigration country like Germany, patriotism should be an important compass in the process of a successful integration of immigrants. Instead of leading diffuse terminological debates about “guiding” or “multicultural”, it is necessary to become aware of it and then to convey one's own values ​​and principles, which as a basis and position can offer the citizens orientation, regardless of whether they are immigrants or native Germans. New cultural input as an expression and result of an open society leads to new diversity and is explicitly required. It should develop when it is at the same time an integrated and integrating part of social life on the basis of the applicable legal and value system and does not arise parallel to it. 5.) Patriotism is the prerequisite for Europeanism The “Europe of the Fatherlands” does not stand in the way of a “Fatherland Europe”. A cosmopolitan, pro-European patriotism sharpens the view of the citizens both for their regional peculiarities and for what they unite. The knowledge of their identity is of fundamental importance, especially for an EU that is expanding beyond the borders of the Christian Occidental cultural area. This is the only way to ensure a balance between the continued existence of the liberal nation state as the guarantor of solidarity and civil liberty on the one hand and the necessary functionality of the EU on the other. Only in this way can the Union be successful on its way to becoming a “global player” and mediator between cultures. 351 6.) Patriotism stands for tomorrow in the consciousness of yesterday While patriotism aims to stabilize and thus secure the future of a specific community, it stands for tomorrow. Patriotism in no way ignores the past or tries to idealize it in the sense of nationalism. Patriotism has a historical memory: In the interests of the common good, it seeks to preserve the good for the future and to learn from past mistakes and grievances in the present. Patriotism cannot be passed on without judgment and cannot be reduced to the formula "My country, right or wrong". 7.) Patriotism reminds the post-heroic society of its victims. The commitment to free patriotism combines a fundamentally consensus-oriented, conflict-avoiding and peaceful attitude with the foreign policy Germany's responsibility in an international security architecture that has become more complex. In order to be able to meet this increased responsibility and also to convey it domestically, the Federal Republic is dependent on commemorating its soldiers who died in the service of freedom and security with appropriate honors, as in is a matter of course in all countries with a great republican tradition. Some steps have already been taken in this field. More should follow. 8.) A patriotism "2.0" is fundamental for the "Berlin Republic" The "Berlin Republic" is fundamentally dependent on patriotism, if you will, on a new "Patriotism 2.0". Be it on a large scale, up to the question of national defense or foreign missions, or be it on a small scale, “on site”, where important communitarian aid is provided in “schools of democracy” and thus the republican foundation is stabilized. Patriotism, by its self-image as free republicanism, opposes any state-centrism as well as a social model of selfish, bondless “ego” without responsibility for the neighbor and the common. Its normative commitment to values ​​beyond particular and situational interests also makes it an important compass when it comes to answering the questions of where “we”, the citizens of the “Berlin Republic”, are going in the future. Its emotional dimension, in turn, which flanks and transcends those of interests, obligations and necessities, makes it a helpful explanation when it comes to the question of how and why "we" go this path, even if it is arduous. 352 Literature Améry, Jean, 1997: Beyond guilt and atonement. Coping attempts by an overwhelmed man. Stuttgart (3rd edition). Ateş, Seyran: Opinion. In: Lammert 2006, pp. 25-31. Bahners, Patrick, 2011: The alarmists: The German fear of Islam. A polemic. Stuttgart (2nd edition). Bahr, Egon, 2003: The German Way. Of course and normal. Munich. Biller, Maxim 2001: German Book. Munich. Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang, 1992: The emergence of the state as a process of secularization. In: Ders .: Law, State, Freedom. Studies in legal philosophy, state theory and constitutional history. Frankfurt 1992 (2nd edition), pp. 92-114. Ders., 2007: The secularized state. Its character, its justification and its problems in the 21st century. Munich. Cammann, Alexander, 2005: rediscovering 1989. The suppressed founding revolution of the Berlin Republic. In: Ruge, Undine / Morat, Daniel (eds.), 2005: Thinking Germany. Contributions to the reflected republic, Wiesbaden 2005, pp. 55-70. Germany Integration Foundation (Ed.), 2010: Sarrazin: A German Debate. Munich. Dettling, Warnfried, 2008: Political Consequences of the Debate on Civil Society. In: Dettling, Daniel (ed.), 2008: The future of civil society. Festschrift for Warnfried Dettling, Wiesbaden 2008, pp. 214-225. di Fabio, Udo, 2005: The culture of freedom. Munich. Fuhr, Eckhard, 2005: Where we can find ourselves. The Berlin Republic as a fatherland. Berlin. Ders., 2007: What is the German Fatherland ?. In: From Politics and Contemporary History, 1-2 / 2007, pp. 3-7. Funke, Manfred, 2006: Patriotism as a social movement. In: The Political Opinion, 2/2006, pp. 37-42. Geiss, Imanuel, 1992: The hysterical dispute. An unpolemical essay. Bonn. Glotz, Peter et al., 2005: Patriotism from the Left. In: Neue Gesellschaft / Frankfurter Hefte, No. 3/2005. Grafe, Peter, 2005: From the spell of National Socialism. In: Glotz et al. 2005, p. 26f. Habermas, Jürgen 1986: A kind of claims settlement. The apologetic tendencies in German historiography. In: “Historikerstreit” 1987, pp. 62-76. Ders., 2009: Pre-political foundations of the democratic constitutional state ?. In: Ders., 2009: Between Naturalism and Religion. Philosophical essays, Frankfurt 2009, pp. 106-118. "Historikerstreit", 1987: "Historikerstreit". Documentation of the controversy about the uniqueness of the Nazi extermination of the Jews. Munich (8th edition). Isensee, Josef (Ed.), 1998: Solidarity in Scarcity. On the problem of priority. Berlin. Jandl, Ernst: clearing. In: Ders .: left and right. poems // statements // peppermints, Munich 1997. Jörges, Hans-Ulrich: Leitkultur Toleranz. In: Lammert 2006, pp. 73-78. Knobloch, Charlotte, 2009: Jewish Identity in Germany. Lecture given on January 15, 2009 at the Academy for Social Ethics and Public Culture in Bonn. Korn, Salomon, 2006: o.T. In: Lammert 2006, pp. 115-119. Kronenberg, Volker, 2006a: Patriotism in Germany. Perspectives for a cosmopolitan nation. Wiesbaden (2nd edition). (3rd, revised and updated edition 2012) 353 Ders., 2006b: opposites that are not / differences that are essential. In: The Parliament, 16.10. 2006. Ders., 2008: Interim assessment of a German debate that is necessary: ​​Leading culture, constitution and patriotism - what unites us? In: Vogel, Bernhard (Ed.), 2008: What unites us? Understanding of society on common principles, Freiburg 2008, pp. 188-209. Ders., 2009a: "Fatherland Federal Republic". Constitution, Nation and Patriotism in the German Post-War Discourse. In: Ders. I.a. (Ed.), 2009: Politics, History and Culture. Science in responsibility for the res publica. Festschrift for Manfred Funke on his 70th birthday, Bonn 2009, pp. 359- 369. Ders., 2009b: “Verfassungspatriotismus” in a united Germany. In: From Politics and Contemporary History, No. 28/2009, pp. 41-46. Ders., 2010: Patriotism 2.0. Common good and citizenship in the Federal Republic of Germany. Munich. Ders./Becker, Manuel, 2010: Summer fairy tales reloaded? The soccer world championships 2006 and 2010 in the light of a new patriotism, in: MUT. Forum for Culture, Politics and History, No. 513 (2010), pp. 22-32. Ders./Weckenbrock, Christoph (Ed.), 2011: Black-Green. The debate. Wiesbaden. Künast, Renate, 2006: Basic values ​​and participation. We need a debate - but not about “leading culture”. In: Lammert 2006, pp. 129-133. Lammert, Norbert (Ed.): Constitution - Patriotism - Leitkultur. What holds our society together. Hamburg. Lau, Jörg, 2006: Self-esteem and self-improvement. The patriotism of the Berlin Republic. In: Merkur, special issue 9-10 / 2006, pp. 800-812. Luft, Stefan, 2007: Farewell to multiculturalism. Ways out of the integration crisis. Gräfeling (2nd edition). Miegel, Meinhard, 2005: The turn of the epoch. Will the West win the future? Berlin. Mohr, Reinhard, 2005: The feeling of Germany. A local lore. Reinbek. Münkler, Herfried, 2009a: “Being a republican of reason is not enough”. Interview. In: the daily newspaper, 10.3. 2009. Ders., 2009b: The Germans and their myths. Berlin. Nolte, Paul, 2004: Generation Reform. Beyond the blocked republic. Munich (4th edition). Ders., 2005: Patriotism as self-improvement. Foundations of a new republicanism, in: Ruge, Undine / Morat, Daniel (eds.), 2005: Thinking Germany. Contributions to the reflected republic, Wiesbaden 2005, pp. 71-82. Rödder, Andreas, 2009: Germany united fatherland. The story of the reunification. Munich. Sarrazin, Thilo, 2010: Germany abolishes itself. How we are putting our country at risk. Munich. Schröder, Gerhard, 2005: Government declaration “Out of responsibility for our country: Strengthening Germany's forces”, 17.3. 2005. At: dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/15/15166.pdf, download on July 15. 2011. Sternberger, Dolf, 1979: Constitutional Patriotism. Speech at the 25th anniversary of the "Academy for Political Education". In: Ders., 1990: Schriften X. Ed. By Peter Haungs et al., Frankfurt 1990, pp. 17-31. Stürmer, Michael, 1986a: Dissonances of Progress. Essays on history and politics in Germany. Munich. Ders., 1986b: History in a land devoid of history. In: “Historikerstreit” 1987, pp. 36-38. Ders., 1988: German questions or the search for reasons of state. Historical-political columns. Munich. 354 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 1959: On Democracy in America. Edited by Theodor Eschenburg. Stuttgart. Viroli, Maurizio, 2002: The Idea of ​​Republican Freedom. From Machiavelli to today. Zurich. Weber, Max, 1988: Economy and Society. Edited by Johannes Winckelmann. Tübingen (5th edition). Wulff, Christian, 2010: Speech by Federal President Christian Wulff on October 3, 2010 in Bremen. At http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Christian-Wulff/Reden/2010/10/ 20101003_Rede.html, downloaded on July 15. 2011.